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LONG-ARM STATUTES: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A consumer in South Carolina opens her high-speed computer, enters the
portal of the Internet, and purchases a product or service from a merchant from
afar. There from her perch in cyberspace, the Internet Commerce (e-commerce)
merchant provides a product that may be defective, fraudulent or even harmful to
human life. The consumer turns to her South Carolina courts for relief, but can
she, will she, and how would she bring the e-commerce vendor into the
jurisdiction of the state, or even be able to serve process upon the non-state
merchant? Here is the growing conundrum of the digital age facing South
Carolina, and the disputes arising out of e-commerce yet to be resolved.
This Article addresses the application of long-arm jurisdiction to legal
conflicts arising out of Internet activity, "online" business, and related
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transactions. Because almost all such activities cross a state line in some manner,
individual or class action-related disputes ultimately end up as diversity of
citizenship actions in federal courts.' Thus, this Article will primarily confine its
discussion to state law relative to application in federal diversity cases.
We present this topic from a practitioner/public policy perspective as the
subject currently confronts businesses. The scope of this Article is primarily
domestic, recognizing that international applications are more complex,
comprising the subject of an Article on its own.
In its early history, personal jurisdiction was based on a state's de facto
2
power over a defendant's person. A business that crossed a state line to do more
than "minimal" commercial contacts was considered to be subject to the
jurisdiction of the non-home state sovereignty in which it was doing business.3
But in the twentieth century with advances in telecommunications and the advent
of the Internet, the "physical presence test" has become much more problematic,
if not operationally inadequate.
Simone Grossi characterized the nub of the personal jurisdiction issue as a
"simple and elegant" one premised on two concepts functioning concurrently:
connecting factors and reasonable expectations.
Yet, despite the simple elegance, the United States Supreme Court has
proven incapable of providing a coherent vision of the law of personal
jurisdiction. In essence, the Court's fact specific, case-by-case approach
5
has produced an ever-widening doctrinal morass.
Long-arm ambiguity in commerce bedevils plaintiffs, defendants, and those
within the legal system as they grapple with state-to-state jurisdictional nuances
in an ever-increasing multi-jurisdictional commercial cyberspace. It is a
conundrum that South Carolina has yet to definitively resolve.
A number of states, including those adjacent to South Carolina, have
answered the personal jurisdiction question by enacting or amending their longarm statutes in a way that defines Internet business as more than "minimal
6
contacts" and provides fair notice to meet concerns about due process. Other

1.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). Federal courts have jurisdiction over
lawsuits between citizens of different states, between a foreign nation and citizens of different
states, and between citizens of different states and a foreign nation. The amount in dispute must
exceed $75,000.
2.
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
3.
Id. (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
4.
Simona Grossi, PersonalJurisdiction:A DoctrinalLabyrinth with No Exit, 47 AKRON L.
REV. 617, 618 (2014).
5.
Id.
6. See Anne Sikes Hornsby, Internet Transactions and Communications: Expanding or
Contracting Traditional Notions of Personal Jurisdiction, 70 ALA. L. REV. 379, 379 (2009)
(explaining that "apply[ing] jurisdictional precedent to the myriad patterns created by the meteoric
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states have answered the question with stare decisis rules by their own state
supreme and appellate courts.
As one of the fastest growing states in the Union, South Carolina is a hotbed
of domestic and international manufacturing, and increasingly, Intemet-related
businesses themselves. South Carolina's highest court is poised to face a case,
sooner rather than later, that will ultimately address and define the scope of
personal jurisdiction for those availing themselves of commerce in the state
through the Internet.
This Article addresses the issue by first providing an overview of the
evolution of personal jurisdiction in federal diversity of citizenship cases and
examining how other states have handled cyber-related personal jurisdiction.
Second, this Article looks at the specific situation in South Carolina, its long-arm
statute, and interpretations by the state supreme court and the federal courts in
the district of South Carolina.
Finally, this Article concludes with an analysis, given current South Carolina
law, of how the personal jurisdiction issue would possibly be addressed in some
future judicial action. Ultimately, resolving this conundrum will play a
significant role in South Carolina's future e-commerce business growth and its
economic development.
A.

Long-Arm Jurisdiction:The Early Years

An initial historical overview of any law subject is useful in understanding
the original intent, nature, and context of modem cases and the continuing
controversies posed today in Internet or e-commerce jurisprudence.
Long-arm jurisdiction has long been a staple of jurisprudence going back to
the English courts. 7 Simply put, it is the power of courts to assert personal

jurisdiction over a non-resident ("foreign") actor to resolve some legal dispute.
Today, this is referenced generally as long-arm jurisdiction. The U.S.
Constitution in 1789 implied long-arm jurisdiction when enacting its Full Faith
and Credit Clause. 9 Yet, the tensions early in the republic, created by states
asserting sovereignty of their courts and the nascent federal judicial system
would soon mirror evolving judicial thought on the limits of the reach of the
Commerce Clause.' 0

rise of Internet use for business" requires an understanding of how state long-arm statutes vary in
scope).
7.
Joseph J. Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of Quasi In
Rem and In Personam Principles, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1147, 1157-58 (1978) (discussing colonial
American adherence to English common law regarding jurisdiction).
8. Jurisdiction,BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
9.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012) (stating that every state must enforce
the judgments of every other state).
10. U.S. CONST. art. V, § 8, cl. 3. Such controversies start with Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1
(1824),

and have continued to the modern day, most recently in Comptroller of Treasury of

Marylandv. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
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Justice Kennedy took note of the constitutional construction creating lines of
judicial demarcation that result in conflict and ambiguity over long-arm
jurisdiction.''
James Smith notes in his article that Justice Kennedy in U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton stated:
the framers "split the atom of sovereignty" in creating a system with
"two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its
own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people
who sustain it and are governed by it."12

The issue itself becomes important as it plays a substantive role in the
decision of litigants and one side or the other's preference to sue in a particular
state, and, ultimately a particular judicial forum. It becomes a significant tactical
business and legal decision. However, perhaps a more important public policy
effect is to the question of which government has authority. As Arthur M.
Weisburd stated:
The controversy over standards of personal jurisdiction, therefore,
implicates more than just selecting a courthouse; it is a dispute about
how to determine when a particular state government may demand
obedience from a particular person.13
The conflict in law and jurisdiction appeared within the Constitution's first
half-century in D'Arcy v. Ketchum.14 In D'Arcy, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that a judgment against one party in Louisiana, for whom the trial court in New
York never obtained personal jurisdiction, could not enforce the order outside
New York under the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause.' 5 The Court
held further that "the international law as it existed among the states in 1790"
would determine the existence of personal jurisdiction.16
Nearly a quarter century later, the Court established personal jurisdiction
limitations in Pennoyer v. Neff, in which personal jurisdiction may be set at the

11. See James C. Smith, Comment, Online Communities as Territorial Units, Personal
Jurisdiction Over Cyberspace After J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 57 ST. Louis U. L.J.
839, 855-58 (citing McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011)) (discussing the lack of
clarity in personal jurisdiction cases).
12. Smith, supra note 11, at 855 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,
838 (1995)).
13. Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U. L.
REV. 377, 378 (1985).
14. See D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850) (discussing how an out-of-state
judgment against a joint-defendant was not entitled to full faith and credit because the defendant
had not been personally notified of the suit).
15. Id. at 172.
16. Id. at 176.
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onset of a legal action by virtue of property owned in a state or physical presence
of a person within a state.' 7 This established what has been a usual and
customary basis for personal jurisdiction that includes: "domicile, voluntary
appearance, consent to service of process, and physical presence." 8
Both D'Arcy and Pennoyer pre-dated the modem commercial technological
advances whereby a market may be entered extensively by the Internet's
electronic conduit without a traditional physical presence.
A further historical attempt to expand long-arm jurisdiction is exemplified
by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the South Carolina case of Clarke v.
Clarke.19 Clarke family members, citizens of South Carolina, "asserted S.C. law
governed" title to land in Connecticut they had inherited. 20 The Court ruled
against them, noting that this violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause and that
21
the land was beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of South Carolina courts.
To rule otherwise would have allowed South Carolina courts to dictate
Connecticut law.22
As American commerce grew with the newly evolving technologies of
railroads, telegraph, and telephone, the ability to extend commerce, and hence its
benefits and liabilities, across state lines increased markedly.23 Into the twentieth
century, the general long-arm rule evolved to establish personal jurisdiction
subject to limits set by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, namely,
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and "traditional notions of 'fair play' and
substantial justice to the defendant, all of which are fact based to each case." 24
Jurisdiction, therefore, may be obtained by:
(1) serving process on the party within the state in which the court is
located, or (2) by reasonable notification to a party outside the state in
25
those instances where a "long-arm statute" applies.
Early threshold problems in defining long-arm jurisdiction involved litigants
in diversity cases in federal courts in which attempts were made to assert federal

17. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714, 728 (1878) ("No person is required to answer
in a suit on whom process has not been served, or whose property has not been attached." (quoting
Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 437, 549-60 (1850)).
18. Grossi, supra note 4, at 621.
19. 178 U.S. 186 (1900).
20. Id. at 186-88.
21. Id. at 195.
22. See id. (stating that the Connecticut law differed from the South Carolina law and that
determination under the Connecticut law was proper).
23. Kevin M. Fitzmaurice & Renu N. Mody, International Shoe Meets the World Wide Web:
Whither PersonalJurisdictionin Florida in the Age of the Internet?, FLA. B.J., Dec. 1997, at 22, 24
(discussing the impact of nationalization of commerce and modem communication and
transportation on personal jurisdiction).
24. RICHARD A. MANN & BARRY S. ROBERTS, BUSINESS LAW AND THE REGULATION OF
BUSINESS 55 (12th ed. 2017).
25. Id.
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common law over and above the long-arm standard of a plaintiff s home state.
Could the federal court make its own decision over long-arm jurisdiction or be
held to the applicable state standard? This was answered in 1938 by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. 27 Here, the Court ruled that state
law would control personal jurisdiction in federal diversity actions. 28 Had the
Erie Rule not been established, businesses would be faced with different
common law in every federal district in every federal circuit-ultimately an
impediment to interstate commerce.
Likewise, the Supreme Court later ruled that where a state lacked long-arm
statute jurisdiction, a federal court could not invent it.29 A decade after Erie, the
Court's "door closing" doctrine was stated in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co. 30
Here, the Court ruled that if a state law did not allow an action, federal courts
31
must deny the action in diversity cases.
The Supreme Court reiterated its "door closing" position in Woods v.
InterstateRealty Co. by denying jurisdiction to a non-resident corporation where
the state law disallowed it.32 And, in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp. the Court
reasserted the principle: "a state may set the terms on which it will permit
litigation in its courts." 33 Thus, the standard was set that federal rules must

incorporate state law for the service of process (personal jurisdiction) and state
process cannot be valid unless the state has explicit jurisdiction under its own
laS34
laws.~
Federal courts were given clear direction to adhere strictly to state law in
diversity of citizenship cases.35 This has since been established in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A). 36 The issue then moved to state definitions of

26. Joan Kessler, The Erie Rule and Long-Arm Statutes, 52 MARQ. L. REV. 116, 116-17
(1968).
27. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
28. Id. at 79.
29. James W. H. Stewart, The Federal "Door-Closing"Doctrine, 11 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
154, 154-55 (1954) (discussing how a federal court must act when there is no forum state rule for
jurisdiction).
30. 337 U.S. 530, 532 (1949).
31. Id. at 532-33 ("When local law qualifies or abridges it, the federal court must follow
suit.").
32. 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949).
33. 337 U.S. 541, 552 (1949).
34. Kessler, supra note 26, at 123.
35. See id. at 122 (citing Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949);
Woods v. Interstate Realty, 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949)) (explaining that "a triumvirate of state law supremacy developed in 1949" with the
Supreme Court's decision to uphold the applicability of state law in three separate challenges to the
Federal Rules on the basis of contrary state law).
36. Absent a special congressional legislative act, the federal court has personal jurisdiction
only if the state court in which it sits would have personal jurisdiction. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 4(k)(1)(A) provides:
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'

what constitutes "sufficient contacts" to assert personal jurisdiction across state
lines.37 A clearer definition of what was meant by "contacts" was first answered
in the famous Supreme Court case InternationalShoe v. Washington.38
International Shoe Company was a Delaware chartered business operating
out of St. Louis, Missouri and selling in Washington through its traveling
salesmen who entered the state.39 The State of Washington sued the company
40
after it failed to pay unemployment taxes required by state law. Process was
served on the company by mail and by personal service of one of its salesmen
while in the state. 4
The Court, recognizing the status of a corporation as a fictitious [quasi]
person, stated the general rule of "sufficient contacts" necessary to establish
personal jurisdiction:
Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended
to be acted upon as though it were a fact, it is clear that, unlike an
individual, its "presence" without, as well as within, the state of its
origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf by
those who are authorized to act for it. To say that the corporation is so
far "present" there as to satisfy due process requirements, for purposes
of taxation or the maintenance of suits against it in the courts of the
state, is to beg the question to be decided. For the terms "present" or
"presence" are used merely to symbolize those activities of the
corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem to be
sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. Those demands may be
met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as
make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government,
to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought
there. An "estimate of the inconveniences" which would result to the
corporation from a trial away from its "home" or principal place of
42
business is relevant in this connection.

(1) In General Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal
jurisdiction over a defendant: (A) who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general
jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.
37. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, he must have "certain minimum contacts" with
a forum state).
38. Id. at 319.
39. Id. at 313.
40. Id. at 312.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 316-17 (internal citations omitted) (citing Klein v. Bd. of Tax Supervisors of
Jefferson Cty., 282 U.S. 19, 24 (1930); Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d
Cir. 1930)).
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Meeting the test of "due process" to an outside entity depends upon a
determination of "the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws."43 That said, the Court went on to further
state:
But, to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection
of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to
obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected
with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the
corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most
instances, hardly be said to be undue.44
International Shoe's standard still contemplated a physical presence in a
state, as the concept of the Internet where no physical contact occurs remained in
the distant future. An early case on point, post-InternationalShoe, was Hanson
v. Denckla.4 5 The case involved a trust purchased by a Pennsylvania citizen and
46
perfected in Delaware. The Pennsylvania citizen later moved to Florida where
she died, and conflict ensued over the trust.47 The Court ruled that there was

insufficient connection with Florida to bring defendants into that jurisdiction, as
they had no business in or offices within the state.48 The Court stated that if a
case is grounded on specific personal jurisdiction, "it is essential . . . that there be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws."4 9
Moreover, the Court was confronted with a case involving transactions by
mail but no physical presence in McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co. 50 In
McGee, a California-based consumer bought a life insurance policy from an
Arizona-based insurance company. 5 The company was subsequently purchased
by a Texas company for which a reinsurance policy on the California policy
52
holder was issued. The Texas firm later refused to pay the beneficiary's claim

43. Int'lShoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319.
44. Id.
45. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). South Carolina adheres to the Hanson Doctrine in practice.
46. Id. at 238.
47. Id. at 239-40.
48. Id. at 251.
49. Id. at 253 (citing Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319).
50. 355 U.S. 220 (1945).
51. Id. at 221.
52. Id.
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and suit was brought in California.53 Here, the only contact was by U.S. mail.54
The Court ruled that personal jurisdiction was valid.
This case, however, is not as clear cut as it would seem. Insurance is state56
regulated and licensed by virtue of inherent state police power. Therefore, there
is an implied acceptance to jurisdiction by selling insurance within a state where
state licensure is required. Nevertheless, McGee stands as an early example of
establishing minimal contact without physical contact in a state.
Moving forward, the Supreme Court faced the personal jurisdiction issue in
World- Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson. Here, the Robinsons, who purchased a
new Audi automobile from a New York dealership, were involved in a traffic
accident while driving through Oklahoma in which the automobile's passengers
were severely burned.59 The Robinsons sued Audi and the New York car
dealership in an Oklahoma federal diversity action asserting Oklahoma long-arm
statute personal jurisdiction on the out-of-state defendants. Here, the Court set
more stringent requirements to protect the due process rights of non-resident
parties:
A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant only so long as there exist "minimum contacts" between the
defendant and the forum State. The defendant's contacts with the forum
State must be such that maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice and the
relationship between the defendant and the forum must be such that it is
"reasonable .

.

. to require the corporation to defend the particular suit

which is brought there." The Due Process Clause "does not contemplate
that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an
individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts,
ties, or relations."60
The Court established a stronger "minimal contacts" threshold to perform
two related but differentiated functions: (1) protect defendants from the burden

53. Id. at 221-22.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 223.
56.

1 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE

§ 2.1

(3d ed. 2016) ("Insurance is a

highly regulated industry due to its well-recognized importance to the public interest, rendering it a
proper subject of regulation and control by the states through the exercise of their police powers.").
57. See 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 137 (2016) (citing Bianco v. Concepts 100, Inc., 436 A.2d 206,
291 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)) ("A foreign insurance company upon obtaining a certificate of authority
to conduct its insurance business in the state voluntarily subjects itself to the jurisdiction of the
state's courts for any cause of action which may be asserted against it.").
58. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
59. Id. at 288.
60. Id. at 291-94 (internal citations omitted).
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of litigating in distant, inconvenient forums; 6 1 and (2) ensure that state courts do

not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their coequal sovereignty
62
status in a federal system. Federal courts in diversity actions must apply a rule
63
of reason or reasonableness to such cases.
The protection against inconvenient litigation is typically described in terms
of "reasonableness" or "fairness." 64 In the Court's words:
We have said that the defendant's contacts with the forum State must be
such that maintenance of the suit "does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.' The relationship between the defendant
and the forum must be such that it is 'reasonable .

.

. to require the

corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there."'
Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the
burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an
appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant factors,
including the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute; the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, at least
when that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiffs power to
choose the forum; the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining
the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of
65
the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
World- Wide Volkswagen arrived just four years prior to the invention of the
personal computer and Internet shortly thereafter. In a foreshadowing of
commerce to come, the Court recognized that changes in the electronic age
66
would also challenge prior views of personal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the
Robinsons' case was too remote, and the Court struck down Oklahoma's ruling
in favor of personal jurisdiction:
As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between
the States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a
similar increase. At the same time, progress in communications and
transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less
burdensome. In response to these changes, the requirements for personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id at 288.
Id. at 291-94.
Id. at 292.
Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id.
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Pennoyer v. Neff to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.67
The Court's jurisdictional evolution foretold in 1980 came quickly. In Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,68 the Supreme Court set out a five-factor

"traditional notion of fair play" test for personal jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants.69 The factors provide:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

What is the burden on the defendant?
What is the interest of the forum state in the litigation?
What is the interest of the plaintiff in litigating the matter in that
state?
Does the allowance of jurisdiction serve interstate efficiency?
Does the allowance of jurisdiction serve interstate policy
interests? 70

'

In Asahi, the Court found that the burden would be severe on the defendant with
only slight interest being established by the other four prongs of the test.7
Asahi ushered the Supreme Court into the area of personal jurisdiction as
applied to foreign (i.e., international) corporations to establish a rule as to when a
non-U.S. company could be drawn into a diversity action within one of the U.S.
federal courts, or even state courts.
Four years later, another attempt was made to bring personal jurisdiction to a
transnational corporation simply by virtue of the fact that it purchased goods
(helicopters) from Texas, though the company had no offices or property in the
state and only had minimal contact by way of pilot training.72 The Supreme
Court held in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall that such
contacts with Texas were insufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction.73
Further, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the Court held
that the nexus between Goodyear, its foreign subsidiaries, and the state of North
74
Carolina was not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.
This case
involved North Carolina residents in a bus accident in Paris, France alleging that
injury resulted from defects in Dunlop tires.

67. Id. at 294 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714 (1878); Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
68. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
69. Id. at 113 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 116.
72. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
73. Id. at 419 (citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 518 (1923)).
74. 564 U.S. 915, 929 (2011).
75. Id. (citing Helicopteros,466 U.S. at 416).
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Perhaps one of the most notorious jurisdiction cases, later made into the
movie Woman in Gold,76 was Maria Altmann's diversity action in California
federal court against the Republic of Austria to return her family's Gustav Klimt
paintings (particularly, Adele Bloch-Bauer, aka The Woman In Gold), valued at
the time at over $135 million, stolen by the Nazis then "assumed" by the
Austrian government in its National Museum in Vienna at the end of World War
II.

In Republic ofAustria v. Altmann,79 the Court did not delve into the nuances

of personal jurisdiction, rather ruling upon the issue of Austria's sovereign
immunitys and the fact that Austria's conduct preceded enactment of the U.S.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.si Thus, the case could proceed in the
California federal district court as a diversity action. Austria ultimately settled
and the paintings were returned.82
Finally, the most recent long-arm jurisdiction case addressed by the U.S.
Supreme Court, again on the subject of an internationally-based company, was
Daimler AG v. Bauman.83 The case was brought by twenty-two residents of
Argentina against Daimler (a German company) alleging tort claims for acts
occurring in Argentina during its military dictatorship.84 The case was brought in
federal court in California even though none of the acts occurred in that state, or
the U.S. itself, and the defendant's only relationship to the United States was
through its Delaware-incorporated subsidiary based in New Jersey. The Court
firmly ruled that the California court had no jurisdiction over the case and the
86
California long-arm statute did not extend to personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs attempting to bring in foreign defendants often invoke "agency
theory".8 7 In Daimler, the plaintiffs argued that because the U.S. subsidiary was
"important" to Daimler's overall organization, it is, in effect, the alter ego of the
main line corporation on principal target of the case. The Supreme Court in
Daimler found the application of agency law too remote and insufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction, stating that such an application would result in

76. WOMAN IN GOLD (Origin Pictures 2015).
77. Carol Vogel, Lauder Pays $135 Million, a Record, for a Klimt Portrait, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 2006.
78. Id.
79. 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
80. Id. at 699-700.
81. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 (1976).
82. See Press Release, Neue Galerie, Neue Galerie New York Agrees to Acquire Spectacular
Klimt Painting, "Adele Bloch-Bauer I" (June 19, 2006) (stating that the painting is now on
permanent display at the Neue Galerie: Museum for German and Austrian Art in New York City).
83. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
84. Id. at 750-51.
85. Id. at 752.
86. Id. at 761-62.
87. Keri Martin, What Remains of Vicarious Jurisdiction for Establishing General
Jurisdiction Over CorporateDefendants After DaimlerAG v. Bauman?, 12 SETON HALL CIR. REV.
1, 19 (2015).
88. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol68/iss1/4

12

Lowenstein and Grabert-Lowenstein: The Long-Arm of the Law: South Carolina's Long-Arm Statute and th
2016]

LONG-ARM OF THE LAW

59

"an outcome that would sweep beyond even the 'sprawling view of general
jurisdiction."' 89 The Court, for now, has put a halt to this expansive view of
general long-arm statute jurisdiction.
One other interesting jurisdictional aspect is the Court's allowance of
personal jurisdiction if a non-resident is voluntarily found within the borders of a
state and is served within that state. 90 This "tag or transient jurisdiction" from
Burnham v. Superior Court of California9' holds even if the presence was
transient, brief, and unrelated to litigation.92 While that appears to contradict
other established prongs in establishing long-arm jurisdiction, for now it
preserves an ancient aspect of law that a person physically in a jurisdiction and
served therein is subject to that sovereign's laws.93
The Court's guidance on long-arm statute application for the most part has
preceded the Internet age. All of its precedent cases to date involved actual
physical presence in states and defined what type of such contacts were casual
versus substantive.94 Other cases involved use of the U.S. mail and/or were
complicated by state licensure statutes [implicit acceptance of the state's
jurisdiction], which provided primafacie evidence of personal jurisdiction.95
But the Internet poses a unique context yet to be explored by the Supreme
Court. Today virtually any product or service may be purchased online. Indeed,
the Internet also provides a dark conduit by which torts such as defamation,
privacy, trespass, tortious interference, and infringement of intellectual property
may take place outside the reach of the forum state. Some products such as
software and information are actually delivered online. Hence, no physical
presence or even "technically" physical delivery to a state from a remote location
occurs.
A business may be located anywhere in the world and enter through a web
portal. That Internet connection itself, being outside of the state's jurisdiction,
may be covered by interstate commerce and, later, Federal Communications

89.

Id. at 760 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 929

(2011)).
90. See Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1990) (explaining
that a state can retain jurisdiction over an individual if the individual was found within its borders
and was properly served with process).
91. See id. at 628 (holding that transient jurisdiction does not impede the due process rights
of the defendant).
92. Id. at 612.
93. Id. at 621.
94. See, e.g., id. at 616-18 (applying the concepts of continuous and systematic contacts and
physical presence to the personal jurisdiction analysis); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980) (applying the concept of isolated contacts to the personal
jurisdiction analysis).
95. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 481 (1985) (stating that the
defendant and plaintiff "carried on a continuous course of direct communication by mail and by
telephone" and using this in the personal jurisdiction analysis).
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96

Commission regulations. Also, to the extent the connection is international, it
may well be outside the limits of the judicial power of the United States
altogether. 97 Physical products may be ordered online and delivered in interstate
commerce by conventional methods of U.S. mail or express services. Other
Internet issues involve disputes over intellectual property rights, contracts or
torts such as defamation, privacy, and trespass of personal property. 98
States are beginning to pass specific laws as to Internet trespass,99 but while
the statutes clarify the violations, the ability to bring non-resident violators into
the jurisdiction of its courts remains problematic. Consider these three statutes
from Georgia as examples:
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-9-93(b) Computer Trespass: Any person who uses a
computer or computer network with knowledge that such use is without
authority and with the intention of: (1) deleting or in any way removing,
either temporarily or permanently, any computer program or data from a
computer or computer network; (2) obstructing, interrupting, or in any
way interfering with the use of a computer program or data; or (3)
altering, damaging, or in any way causing the malfunction of a
computer ... .100
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-9-93(c) Computer Invasion of Privacy: Any person
who uses a computer with the intention of examining any employment,
medical, salary, credit, or any other financial or personal data relating to
any other person with knowledge that such examination is without
authority shall be guilty of computer invasion of privacy.1ot

96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Communications Act of 1934, Federal Communications Act
(1944 as amended), 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2012 & Supp. 2016); Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 1, 1 (1877).
97. "Privacy and trespass of personal property" here involves the growing litigation via the
Internet of a non-resident online hacking into a private computer to obtain personal information or
installing malicious software on a non-consenting individual's computer. More recently, the
commercial tactic of placing a tracking "cookie" on the computers of those who access a website is
being struck down as a form of personal property trespass or other legal violation. Just recently,
Verizon agreed to a consent order fine of $1.3 million by the Federal Communications Commission
for such a violation. In re Cellco Partnership, 31 F.C.C. Rcd. 1843, 1854 (2016).
98. Id.
99. See Computer Crime Statutes, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 12,
2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/comput
er-hacking-and-unauthorized-access-laws.aspx (listing state's crime laws, including computer
trespass).

100. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93(b) (2011); Candace M. Williams & John R. Coleman, Jr.,
Computer Trespassing: What You Should Know?, COLEMAN, CHAMBERS, ROGERS & WILLIAMS,
LLP, http://www.colemanchambers.com/Articles/Computer-Trespassing-What-You-Should-Know.
shtml.
101. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93(c).
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Ga. Code Ann. § 16-9-93(a) Computer theft: Any person who uses a
computer or computer network with knowledge that such use is without
authority and with the intention of: (1) taking or appropriating any
property of another, whether or not with the intention of depriving the
owner of possession; (2) obtaining property by any deceitful means or
artful practice; or (3) converting property to such person's uses in
violation of an agreement or other known legal obligation to make a
specified application of such property shall be guilty of the crime of
computer theft.102

Internet purchases are no longer simple items such as books, movies, or
general office supplies. They include sophisticated commercial, industrial, and
consumer products such as appliances, machinery, automobiles, prescription
drugs, and other products that, if defective, may result in tort damage claims and
lawsuits.
Longstanding state franchise and dealership laws are being challenged in the
automobile industry as the nascent "green" manufacturer, Tesla Motors, seeks to
sell its cars exclusively over the Internet.103 In a class action status, such cases
would become classic diversity of citizenship federal actions. The questions then
04
arise as to personal jurisdiction, state law, and application of the Asahi Test
posed to each federal judge on a case-by-case basis.105
Tesla Motors presents a yet-to-be-seen case in point. Tesla is a cutting edge
auto manufacturer producing high-end electric automobiles.106 Tesla is
incorporated in Delaware and based in Palo Alto, California. 0 7 Unlike main-line
auto manufacturers (e.g. General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Toyota, etc.), Tesla

102. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93(a).
103. See, e.g., Callum Borchers, Automaker Tesla Looks to Bypass Car Dealers, Bos. GLOBE
MEDIA PARTNERS, LLC (Nov. 20, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/11/20/teslabattles-auto-dealers-direct-sales-consumers/3flxBFN21xH8QqQc3jijTP/story.htm;
Stephen
Edelstein, Tesla Wins the Battle to Sell In Massachusetts. Which States are 'Pro-Tesla?,'
CHRISTIAN

SC.

MONITOR

(Sept.

18,

2014),

http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/In-

Gear/2014/091 8/Tesla-wins-the-battle-to-sell-in-Masachusetts.-Which-states-are-pro-Tesla
(describing the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision to uphold the lower court's
dismissal of a suit against Tesla Motors brought by the state's automobile dealers association
because the association did not have standing to sue Tesla Motors for operating a company-owned
store).
104. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (citing
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
105. See id. (explaining that the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction depends upon the
court's evaluation of several factors, such as the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum
state, and the plaintiff s interest in obtaining relief).
106. See e.g., About Tesla, TESLA MOTORS, https://www.tesla.com/about (explaining that the
founders of Tesla Motors wanted to prove that electric cars could be better than gasoline-powered
cars and that Tesla is a company that focuses on energy innovation in addition to being an
automaker).
107. SEC Filings, TESLA MOTORS, http://ir.tesla.com/secfiling.cfm?filinglD=1564590-1623024&CIK=1318605.
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sells its cars exclusively through Internet orders. 08 It does not have physical
dealerships or service centers but rather, "galleries" to display its cars in twentytwo states and the District of Columbia.1 09 Customers can see the automobile but
must still order online for home delivery."10
Suppose a Tesla customer in South Carolina purchased an automobile.
(South Carolina has no Tesla Galleries)."' The automobile proved to be
defective and caused an actionable injury. Where would the plaintiff go to get
relief? Would merely shipping a Tesla car into the state be sufficient contacts to
file in state court or federal court? Or, are the Internet circumstances such that a
South Carolina consumer would be forced into California jurisdiction?
There is no established immediate answer because neither the South
Carolina General Assembly, by statute, nor the South Carolina Supreme Court,
by opinion, has addressed a relevant Internet case on point to the applicability of
its long-arm statute to non-resident Internet businesses.112
To help address this hypothetical question, this Article will look at how
other states have handled personal jurisdiction over the Internet. Then it will
address the potential situation in South Carolina.
II.

LONG-ARM STATUTES AND THE INTERNET AMONG THE STATES

Over the years, while the Supreme Court grappled with the application of the
long-arm statutes and personal jurisdiction of those in some form of physical
presence in states, technology was making a monumental, transformational
change establishing the world-wide online electronic marketplace we know
today as the Internet. The Internet's origins go back to the 1960s in academic
and military applications,1' but with the advent of the personal computer (PC),
advances in computing, and wireless and fiber optic transmission, by the early
1990s and fully by 1996, it had evolved into a global system that interconnects
servers, mainframes, personal, and commercial computer networks, including
shared cloud storage. The Internet allows instantaneous and interactive

108. See Support, TESLA MOTORS, https://www.tesla.com/support/how-ordering-works
(describing how ordering a Tesla is just like any other buying experience on the Internet).
109. See US Tesla Stores and Galleries, TESLA MOTORS, https://www.tesla.com/findus/list/
stores/United% (listing galleries in the United States by state).
110. See Support: Test Drive, TESLA MOTORS, https://www.tesla.com/support/test-drive
(explaining that Tesla vehicles are available to test drive at several locations and that each Tesla
vehicle is custom built for each customer).
111. See US Tesla Stores and Galleries, supra note 109 (showing no gallery listings for South
Carolina).
112. But see Brown v. Geha-Werke GmBH, 69 F. Supp. 2d 770, 775 (1999) (applying the
long-arm statute of South Carolina to an Internet defendant).
113. See
Ian
Peter,
The
Beginnings
of
the
Internet, NET
HISTORY,
http://www.nethistory.info/History%/`20of%/`20the%`20Internet/beginnings.html
(describing
the
Internet's beginning as an "unanticipated result" of an unsuccessful component of academic and
military research).
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connection with millions of people and businesses World-Wide. Messages are
"e-mail" and purchases are often made via an electronic "shopping basket."
The Internet has created an entire business function commonly referred
to as e-business or e-commerce. E-business represents the use of
Internet and business technology in a company's operations. Most
companies in the business environment have implemented some form of
Internet or business technology into their business operations. While
some companies faced the major changeover when developing an ebusiness function, other companies may have been on the edge of this
technology before the widespread use of the Internet."14
The spectacular growth of e-commerce may be demonstrated by the results
of the U.S. Census Bureau's Fourth Quarter 2015 report for e-commerce sales." 5
Total e-commerce for the quarter was $107.1 billion, up 32% over 2014
compared with the overall sales market up only 1.6%.11 6 For the year 2015, total
e-commerce sales were estimated to be $341.7 billion, up 14.6%, compared to
overall sales growth of 1.4%.117 E-commerce represents 7.5% of total sales and
is growing at an extremely large rate such that its proportion of the sector is
estimated to double in three years.
Retail figures pale in comparison with the volume of business-to-business
(B2B) e-commerce. Estimates suggest that by 2020 over $6.7 trillion in sales and
economic transactions will occur by Internet means.1 9 But with all this volume
of business transiting the Internet, disputes are bound to occur on contract, tort,
product liability, intellectual property, and all manner of commercial law
historically handled by federal courts in diversity lawsuits.
In fact, such disputes have been growing parallel to the growth of the
Internet from the late 1990s.120 To date, the issue of long-arm statutes and

personal jurisdiction has been left to interpretation in state courts and federal
districts, along with a few federal circuit court rulings.121 However, twenty years

&

114. Osmond Vitez, The Effect of the Internet on Modern Businesses & Corporations,
HOUSTON
CHRONICLE,
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/effect-Internet-modern-businessescorporations-896.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2016).
115. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES 4TH
QUARTER (2015).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Sarwant Singh, B2B eCommerce Market Worth $6.7 Trillion by 2020; Alibaba
Amazon: China the Front Runners, FORBES, Nov. 6, 2014.
120. See Michael L. Rustad & Diane D'Angelo, The Path of Internet Law: An Annotated
Guide to Legal Landmarks, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 7 (2011) (explaining the positive
correlation between the increase of commercial activity through the Internet and the increase in
legal disputes).
121. Long-Arm
Statutes:
A
Fifty-State
Survey,
VEDDER
PRICE
(2003),
http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/law/08-732/Jurisdiction/LongArmSurvey.pdf
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into the Internet, the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to take a decisive Internet case
on par with stare decisis provided in International Shoe or World-Wide
Volkswagen. States are thus left to their own devices to adjudicate jurisdictional
issues.
Courts addressing this issue today generally ask two questions: (1) Does
a state or federal procedural rule or statute exist that provides for
jurisdiction under the alleged facts and circumstances of the case? and
(2) If so, are the procedural due process requirements of the respective
state and federal constitutions sufficiently met?1 22
State approaches may be generally portrayed in two categories.123 The first
category is passive Internet websites.1 24 These are informational or web portals
in which individuals may obtain information and direction for transactions, but
are not necessarily "interactive."1 25 They may be considered the web page
version of the phone book, yellow pages, or, more precisely, an "electronic"
version of a highway billboard.126 To date, courts have fairly consistently ruled
that a mere web presence alone is insufficient to meet the "minimum contacts"
test of International Shoe.127 Along with due process concerns, such cases
usually fail to meet long-arm standards.128
A.

Passive Web Presence

For example, in Arkansas' Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. a manufacturer
who placed an advertisement on the Internet was found to have insufficient
minimal contact with the state to invoke personal jurisdiction.129 Likewise, in
Delaware's Kane v. Coffman, a posting made outside the state on the Internet but
received by a person inside the state of Delaware failed to justify minimal
contact for personal jurisdiction.1 30

122. Id. at i.
123. Christopher Wolf, The Evolving Test for Jurisdiction, PROSKAUER ROSE LLP,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ilaw/Jurisdiction/EvolvingTest forJurisdictionFull.html.
124. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
125. See id. (explaining that passive websites do little more than provide information, but
interactive websites allow users to exchange information with the host computer).
126. See Butler v. Beer Across Am., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1268 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (describing a
passive Internet site as "little more than an electronic billboard for the posting of information").
127. See Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (explaining that because a passive website does
little more than provide information, it is not a ground for the exercise of personal jurisdiction).
128. See Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 923 (D. Or.
1999) (stating that due process requires that personal jurisdiction be based on fairness; therefore, if
the defendant does not have a "fair warning" that his activities on the Internet will subject him to the
jurisdiction of a state, then personal jurisdiction is improper).
129. Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356, 1365 (W.D. Ark. 1997).
130. Kane v. Coffman, No. OOC-08-236, 2001 WL 914016, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 10,
2001).
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In some cases, even when a vendor offered business over the Internet, courts
have shown a tendency toward denying personal jurisdiction.' 3 ' Such was the
case in Kansas in D.J 's Rock Creek Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Foam & Insulation
Manufacturing Co.132 In this case, a supplier maintained an interactive website
that could be accessed by Kansas residents, offering 122 products in forty-eight
categories.1 33 Customers could order via an online toll-free number and inquire
for a price quote.1 34 Nevertheless, because the supplier had no "traditional"
forms of business contacts in Kansas,1 35 and, the supplier had no actual Internetbased contacts with Kansas citizens within that state,136 the court denied personal
jurisdiction.137
B. Interactive Web Presence
If merely having a static presence on the Internet is insufficient "minimal
contacts" and fails to meet the standard of "substantial and continuous local
activity," then what about the contemporary e-commerce model in which web
presence is fully interactive? Here, many state examples exist representing
different degrees of definition and application.138
A number of states, including South Carolina, still have had no precedentsetting Internet jurisdiction cases. For those states that have, the general trend is
to assert long-arm jurisdiction if the entity has an interactive website available to
residents of the state in which those residents may access and do active business
with the out-of-state business online.1 39
For example, in Connecticut a more aggressive trial court ruling in Gates v.
Royal Palace Hotel held that concentrated online advertising within the state,
active booking of reservations for Connecticut citizens, even by travel agents,
and the invitation to state residents to make online reservations constituted in-

131. See Grimaldi v. Guinn, 895 N.Y.S.2d 156, 166-67 (2010) (stating that appellant-seller's
website was "thoroughly passive in nature" and would not alone provide a basis for the assertion of
personal jurisdiction).
132. See D.J.'s Rock Creek Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Foam & Insulation Mfg. Co., No. 014139-JAR, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13470, at *16 (D. Kan. June 10, 2002).
133. Id. at *10.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at *13.
137. Id. at *16.
138. Thomas A. Dickerson et al., Personal Jurisdiction and the Marketing of Goods and
Services on the Internet, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 31, 51 (2012).
139. See Nelson v. Myrtle Beach Collegiate Summer Baseball League, LLC, No. 3:12CV1655
(JBA), 2013 WL 6273890, at *1, *3-4 (D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2013) (holding that the defendant's
website contemplated interactivity on several levels, including commercial transactions, which
supported a finding of personal jurisdiction).
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forum state transactions of business on which personal jurisdiction was
appropriately based.1 40

In Illinois, the court in Aero Products International, Inc. v. Intex
Corporation(a case dealing with issues of federal patent and trademark law and
state law deceptive trade practices and consumer fraud) allowed a finding of
personal jurisdiction where the corporation sold products to Illinois residents
over the Internet as well as in stores located in the state.141
In North Carolina, the basis for asserting legitimate personal jurisdiction
over an out-of-state company was not only the website, but also the conduct of
the parties by telephone and mail together with the online activity.142 In
Replacements, Ltd. v. MidweSterling (a case involving a charge of
misappropriated trade secrets by a Missouri corporation), North Carolina's
Appeals Court found that the Missouri firm had maintained a longstanding
business relationship, 143 there was evidence of business transaction phone calls
to the North Carolina business, and direct mail was sent to at least fifty residents
of the state. 144 Moreover, the company advertised in media circulated throughout
North Carolina in addition to its website, all available to state citizens. 145 The
court considered this activity to be sustained and continuous enough to constitute
more than minimal contact on which personal jurisdiction was properly based.146
In Oklahoma, the Tenth Circuit held in Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic
Internet Solutions, Inc. that the conduct of the Internet provider was sufficient to
assert long-arm jurisdiction. 147 A defendant who suffered a marked slowdown in
his e-mail running through plaintiffs server, even with knowledge of the effect,
was sufficient to establish minimal contacts for personal jurisdiction.148
In New York, the Second Circuit upheld personal jurisdiction in a trademark
infringement case, Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC.149 Here, a
California resident online merchant was selling fake Chloe-branded handbags to
residents of New York. 1o The court ruled that the seller's act of conducting
substantial business activity with New York was more than sufficient to establish
15 1
long-arm jurisdiction.

140. Gates v. Royal Palace Hotel, No. CV 9866595S, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3740, at *10
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 1998).
141. Aero Prods. Int'l v. Intex Corp., No. 02 C 2590, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17948, at *24
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2002).
142. Replacements, Ltd. v. MidweSterling, 515 S.E.2d 46, 50 (1999).
143. Id. at 50.
144. Id. at 51.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atl. Internet Sols., Inc., 205 F.3d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 2000).
148. Id. at 1248-49.
149. Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir. 2010).
150. Id. at 162.
151. Id.
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Likewise, in Penguin Group (USA), Inc. v. American Buddha, Penguin, a
New York-based publishing company, sued Buddha, an Oregon corporation with
its principal place of business in Arizona, for copyright infringement.152 The
New York court, referencing New York's particular long-arm statute, found that
for the purposes of a case on copyright infringement, New York could assert
personal jurisdiction on situs grounds.1 53 That is, the Internet is deemed the
"situs of injury."1 54 The court expounded that when one commits a tortious act
over the Internet, he should expect consequences in the state from which the
non-resident actor attains revenue.i15
C. Sliding Scale Standards: The Zippo Test and the CalderEffects Test
An oft-cited case from Pennsylvania is Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo
Dot Com, Inc.156 In Zippo, the District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania ruled that the mere conduct of e-commerce in the state with its
residents constituted "personal availment" of doing business in the state.15 7 The
evidence included downloading messages and other commercial transaction
interactions.
The case involved issues of trademark dilution, trademark
infringement, and false designation. 159
The Zippo Sliding Scale Test, as it is now known, calls for an analysis of a
sliding scale which at one extreme finds a non-resident defendant actively doing
business over the Internet in a forum state, while on the other extreme are nonresident defendants with simply a "passive" website or presence.160 The midpoint of the scale is an interactive website that is primarily for the exchange of
information.161

The court then determines the extent of "active business" that would qualify
for personal jurisdiction in the forum, as well as the extent of "passive business"
that would result in no personal jurisdiction.162 The decision on personal
jurisdiction in the middle part of the scale is a function of fact-based analysis as
to the level of interactivity of the website, the nature and extent of information
exchanged, and commercial activity conducted over the Internet in the forum
state.1 63

152. Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. American Buddha, 946 N.E.2d 159, 165 (2011).
153. Id. at 165.
154. Id. at 161-62.
155. Id. 162. See also R. Michelle Boldon, Long-Arm Statutes and Internet Jurisdiction, 67
Bus. LAW 313, 314 (2011).
156. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
157. Id. at 1125-26.
158. Id. at 1126.
159. Id. at 1121.
160. Id. at 1124.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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(1) SubstantialInternet business (personal jurisdiction is proper)
(2) Interactive Internet (personal jurisdiction may be proper depending on
factual basis)
(3) Passive Advertising Internet (personal jurisdiction is never proper)
The Zippo Test has not subsequently been considered by federal circuit courts or
the Supreme Court and remains persuasive authority when used in jurisdictional
cases elsewhere.1 64

The Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones created another form of a sliding
scale test, the Calder Effects Test.165 Although the case and its precedent are
primarily confined to matters in tort, 166 a number of states have developed

"effects tests" with a common law "sliding scale" standard.167 Yet, Smith has
found that the test has little use in peer-to-peer transaction cases and libel cases
over the Internet.168 The standard, as established, while not specific to Internet
cases, has been referenced in cyber cases to recognize Internet businesses.16 9
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court established three elements in the Calder
Test on which personal jurisdiction findings are to be based.1 70 Such elements
would have particular applicability when applied to e-commerce cases: (1)
intentional conduct; (2) expressly aimed at the forum state; and (3) with the
defendant's knowledge that the effects would be felt in the forum state.17 1
An example of an "effects test" was employed in Texas in Riviera Operating
Corp. v. Dawson in which the sliding scale approach was used to establish that
the non-resident defendant's only contact with the state was by way of the
Internet, which involved no business transactions or contracts.172 Hence,
personal jurisdiction was denied. 173
Likewise, in Louisiana's Crummey v. Morgan, a purchaser of a recreational
vehicle (RV) over eBay encountered defects in the RV for which the Texas seller

164. Eric Hawkins, GeneralJurisdiction andInternet Contacts: What Role, IfAny, Should the
Zippo Sliding Scale Test Play in the Analysis?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2371, 2385-88 (2006)
(showing that no court has overruled the Zippo test and that many courts still apply it in their
analyses).
165. 465 U.S. 783, 787 n.6 (1984).
166. See id. at 785 (stating that Respondent brought the suit against Petitioners "for libel,
invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional harm").
167. See, e.g., Erin F. Norris, Why the Internet Isn't Special: Restoring Predictability to
PersonalJurisdiction,53 U. ARIZ. L. REV. 1013, 1024 (2011) (citing In re Chocolate Confectionary
Antitrust Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d 538, 557-65 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (discussing how the "effects test" is
one of the tests used to determine whether or not a state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant).
168. Smith, supra note 11, at 852.
169. See Emissive Energy Corp. v. Spa-Simrad, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 40 (2011); Abdouch v.
Lopez, 829 N.W.2d 662 (2013); Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (2002).
170. Norris, supra note 167, at 1020.
171. Id.
172. Riviera Operating Corp. v. Dawson, 29 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tex. App. 2000).
173. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol68/iss1/4

22

Lowenstein and Grabert-Lowenstein: The Long-Arm of the Law: South Carolina's Long-Arm Statute and th
2016]

LONG-ARM OF THE LAW

69

would not assume responsibility.1 74 Consequently, in response to the lawsuit, the
sellers claimed Louisiana lacked personal jurisdiction over them. 7 5 The court
ruled that because the sellers had regularly and continuously used eBay as an ecommerce means of doing business, personal jurisdiction was appropriate.176
One final test that has appeared in courts is the Targeting Test or Approach,
which finds personal jurisdiction based on evidence that a non-resident
defendant specifically targeted a forum state for online activities, commercial or
otherwise.17 7 This test has not been widespread and is controversial, but it is
another attempt to craft some reasonable, defining criteria for personal
178
jurisdiction at trial court levels.
Smith articulates the difficulty in providing a
clear test:
The fact that online activities are not fixed at a particular point in space
frustrates attempts to analyze online interactions as if they take place in
a forum state.1 79

With all the swirling activity of state court rulings and federal court
decisions in diversity cases on long-arm jurisdiction, where are the limits of
South Carolina's long-arm and potential handling of the ever-increasing ecommerce ongoing within the state?
D.

Tax JurisdictionApproach

The conventional interpretations of International Shoe and World-Wide
Volkswagen have left wide ambiguities in the application of long-arm statutes to
e-commerce, now left to the nuances of state-by-state interpretation. so But, one
potential approach to resolving jurisdictional definition may come from an
unlikely source: sales tax law policy and its attendant theories of tax jurisdiction.
Ironically, InternationalShoe's subject was tax jurisdiction.
In a case long before the advent of the Internet, the Supreme Court set the
parameters for which states could assert jurisdiction on taxing non-resident
entities within the limits of the Due Process Clause and interstate commerce. The
Court in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, consistent with International

174. Crummey v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 499 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 504.
177. Annie Soo Yeon Ahn, Note, Clarifying the Standardsfor PersonalJurisdiction in Light
of Growing Transactionson the Internet: The Zippo Test and Pleading of PersonalJurisdiction, 99
MINN. L. REv. 2325, 2325-2337 (2015).
178. Id. at 2337.
179. Smith, supra note 11, at 848.
180. See Richard A. Rochlin, Cyberspace, InternationalShoe, and the Changing Context for
PersonalJurisdiction, 32 CONN. L. REV. 653, 654 (2000) (stating that "issues are being decided at
the district court level with very little guidance" from the Supreme Court and that "courts have been
forced to adapt to the Shoe framework" independently of one another).
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Shoe, ruled: "(1) No tax may be imposed on interstate business unless there is
minimal connection between the activities taxed and the taxing state, and (2)
Income subject to the state tax must be rationally related to 'values connected
with the taxing state."" 8
In opening the door to a vast electronic marketplace, the Internet also opened
the door to buyers and sellers to transact business without paying sales tax in
forty-seven of the fifty states.182 The inability of states to enforce sales taxes on
online purchases entering their states arises from a pre-Internet Supreme Court
ruling dealing with catalog sales in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.183 Quill
essentially further defined the Moorman Rule.1 84
In the nearly twenty-five years since Quill, e-commerce has exploded. The
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) estimates the annual loss of
sales tax revenue to states by out-of-jurisdiction sales to state citizens is
approximately $23.3 billion, of which approximately $11.4 billion is from ecommerce and grows each year.
For the purposes of taxes, the Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process
Clause did not require a physical presence in the state.186 The fact that Quill
intentionally directed its activities to residents of the state was sufficient to assert
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident business:
The Due Process Clause does not bar enforcement of the State's use tax
against Quill. This Court's due process jurisprudence has evolved
substantially since Bellas Hess, abandoning formalistic tests focused on
a defendant's presence within a State in favor of a more flexible inquiry
into whether a defendant's contacts with the forum made it reasonable,
in the context of the federal system of government, to require it to
defend the suit in that State. Thus, to the extent that this Court's
decisions have indicated that the clause requires a physical presence in a
State, they are overruled. In this case, Quill has purposefully directed its
activities at North Dakota residents, the magnitude of those contacts are

181. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978).
182. Alaska, Oregon, and Montana have no sales taxes but do have municipal option sales
taxes. Michael J. Fleming, States with No Sales Tax, SALESTAXSUPPORT.COM,
http://www.salestaxsupport.com/blogs/issues/sales-tax-basics/states-with-no-sales-tax/.
183. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
184. See id. at 308 (stating that the Due Process clause did not bar enforcement of the state's
use of a tax against Quill because Quill had "purposefully directed its activities at North Dakota
residents" and that the "magnitude of those contacts [was] more than sufficient for due process
purposes").
185. Collecting E-Commerce Taxes: FairnessLegislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (NCSL) (Nov. 14, 2014) http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/collecting-ecommerce-taxes-an-interactive-map.aspx.
186. Quill, 504 U.S. at 317.
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more than sufficient for due process purposes, and the tax is related to
the benefits Quill receives from access to the State.
However, the Court went on to further rule that North Dakota's sales tax was
unconstitutional as a burden on interstate commerce, which is the exclusive
jurisdiction of Congress under the Commerce Clause. 88 Thus, the Court
delineated a jurisdictional "Catch-22":
Contrary to the State's argument, a mail order house may have the
''minimum contacts" with a taxing State as required by the Due Process
Clause, and yet lack the "substantial nexus" with the State required by
the Commerce Clause. These requirements are not identical and are
animated by different constitutional concerns and policies. Due process
concerns the fundamental fairness of governmental activity, and the
touchstone of due process nexus analysis is often identified as "notice"
or "fair warning." In contrast, the Commerce Clause and its nexus
requirement are informed by structural concerns about the effects of
state regulation on the national economy.
In the end, the Court relied upon precedent from Complete Auto Transit, Inc.
v. Brady, its Four-Part Test, and guidance from National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue of Illinois in determining interstate commerce burden.1 90
The Complete Auto Test factors to satisfy compliance with the Commerce
Clause are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

the tax must be applicable to substantial nexus with the taxing state;
is fairly apportioned;
does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and,
is fairly related to services provided by the state.191

Bellas Hess requires, "sharp distinction ... between mail-order sellers
with ... [a physical presence in the taxing] State, and those who do no more than
communicate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a
general interstate business."' 92
The Court, at that time cognizant of the complexities of application to
catalog sales, could not have imagined the even greater complications that would
be posed over twenty years later by the advent of the Internet and e-commerce.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 308.
Id.
Id. at 312, 313.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1997).
Id. at 279.
Quill, 504 U.S. at 307.
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Unwilling to make new law, the Court deferred the matter to be resolved by
Congress:
This aspect of our decision is made easier by the fact that the
underlying issue is not only one that Congress may be better qualified to
resolve, but also one that Congress has the ultimate power to resolve.
No matter how we evaluate the burdens that use taxes impose on
interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree with our
-193

conclusions.

While the Quill Court in explaining the Bellas Hess decision did not
necessarily establish a "bright line" rule of physical presence, the reality of the
application of Quill ever since, and its precedent basis of Bellas Hess, together
with Complete Auto, effectively established not only a bright line, but a virtual
insurmountable wall to states' attempts to assess sales tax jurisdiction on ecommerce absent a "physical" presence in a particular state.1 94 Since 1992 states
have attempted to impose voluntary use taxes upon its own citizens who buy
over the Internet with scant voluntary taxpayer compliance. Congress has taken
no action to date to enact legislation resolving or developing a national policy on
e-commerce sales taxes.
After nearly a quarter century of losing tax jurisdiction and substantial
revenue to e-commerce, states are fighting back in open defiance to force the
Supreme Court to revisit Quill in light of the changed Internet marketplace.
Effective January 1, 2016, Alabama enacted a law requiring out-of-state vendors
to collect sales taxes if they have over $250,000 of e-commerce to citizens of
Alabama.1 95 The state asserts the theory that this level of volume constitutes
"economic presence" for the purposes of jurisdiction.1 96 A dozen states, which
include Utah, Nebraska, Mississippi, and Louisiana are considering such laws,1 97
and the NCSL is writing model legislation, all of which seeks to force the tax
jurisdictional issue.' 98
This, too, presents its own complications. With local options by states, there
are over 10,000 separate sales taxing districts in the U.S.1 99 Nevertheless, if state

193. Id. at 318.
194. Hamilton Davison, How State Revenuers Are Going After E-Commerce, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 11, 2016.
195. Id.
196. ALA. CODE § 40-23-1 (2015) ("a transaction shall not be closed or a sale completed until
the time and place when and where title is transferred by the seller or seller's agent to the purchaser
or purchaser's agent, and for the purpose of determining transfer of title, a common carrier or the U.
S. Postal Service shall be deemed to be the agent of the seller, regardless of any F.O.B. point and
regardless of who selects the method of transportation, and regardless of by whom or the method by
which freight, postage, or other transportation charge is paid.").
197. Davison, supra note 194.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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challenges are successful at the Supreme Court level, such transformational
definition will inure beyond taxes to liability, tort and other legal issues related
to e-commerce activity.
III. SOUTH CAROLINA: How LONG IS ITS ARM?
South Carolina, not unlike other states, maintains a statutory long-arm
statute. 200 The statutory application of personal jurisdiction arose from the
revision of the Uniform Sales Act out of the National Conference of
Commissioners in 1902.201 The statute was subsequently introduced as part of
South Carolina's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in 1962.202 South

Carolina Code section 36-2-803 states:
(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts
directly or by an agent as to a cause of action arising from the
person's:
(1) transacting any business in this State;
(2) contracting to supply services or things in the State;
(3) commission of a tortious act in whole or in part in this State;
(4) causing tortious injury or death in this State by an act or
omission outside this State if he regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct,
or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or
services rendered, in this State; or
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this
State; or
(6) contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within
this State at the time of contracting;
(7) entry into a contract to be performed in whole or in part by
either party in this State; or

200. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803 (2012).
201. See VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY:
RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 82 (1995) (showing that not all

states were on board with the new revisions, so there was no uniformity among jurisdictions).
202. § 36-2-803 (previously appearing under § 10.2-803).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2016

27

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4
74

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 68: 47

(8) production, manufacture, or distribution of goods with the
reasonable expectation that those goods are to be used or
consumed in this State and are so used or consumed.
(B) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section,
only a cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section
may be asserted against him, and such action, if brought in this
State, shall not be subject to the provisions of § 15-7-100 (3).203
While the plain reading of the statute would suggest a fit with application to
e-commerce/Intemet activity, the state judiciary has yet to make such an
interpretation and remains a strict adherent to due process concerns: "South
Carolina enacted its version of the long-arm statute in 1966 and it has been
interpreted to extend to the outer limits of the Due Process Clause."204
South Carolina courts have interpreted the long-arm statute as it applies to
businesses in the state and those with a physical presence of more than minimal
contacts, which provides a glimpse at possible application should the South
Carolina Supreme Court ultimately take a precedent-setting case. That likelihood
increases over time as South Carolina, and the rest of the nation, experiences
continued rapid growth of e-commerce over the Internet.205 A further elaboration
of personal jurisdiction was enacted to clarify jurisdiction based upon "an
enduring relationship:"
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in,
organized under the laws of, doing business, or maintaining his or its
206
principal place of business in, this State as to any cause of action.
South Carolina, with a population of over 4,000,000 people (about 1% of the
207
U.S. population),
is one of the fastest growing states in the Union. It has
attracted substantial Internet businesses to locate in the state, such as
20 8
Amazon.com (Lexington), 209 and STARTEK
Monster.com (Florence),

203. Id.
204. Meyer v. Paschal, 330 S.C. 175, 181, 498 S.E.2d 635, 638 (1998) (citing S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 36-2-803 (1976)).
205. See Frank A. Rainwater & Gordon 0. Shuford, South CarolinaE-Commerce Sales and
Use Tax Revenue Estimatesfor FY2014-2015, S.C. BOARD OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS 1 (Dec. 3,
2013) http://www.rfa.sc.gov/files/E-Commercesalestaxanalysis for FY 2014-15_with cover
page.pdf. (discussing South Carolina's economic growth through e-commerce).
206. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-802 (2012).
207. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN FACT FINDER ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT
POPULATION FOR SELECTED AGE GROUPS BY SEX FOR THE UNITED STATES, STATES, COUNTIES
AND PUERTO RICO COMMONWEALTH AND MUNICIPIOS (2015).

208. Press Release, S.C. Dep't of Commerce, Monster Begins Recruitment for Customer
Service Center in Florence, South Carolina (July 21, 2008).
209. Press Release, S.C. Dep't of Commerce, Amazon Announces
Spartanburg County, South Carolina (Jan. 23, 2012).
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211

(Myrtle Beach),210 among other Internet entrepreneurial businesses.
South
Carolina citizens are active-continuous users of e-commerce, spending an
estimated $5.1 billion via the Internet.212 One would be hard-pressed to find any
bank or credit union in the state that does not provide business or personal
customers with online account transaction capacity. The state has become a
center of national and international manufacturing including BMW, Boeing,
Volvo, Daimler-Benz, Michelin, Bridgestone, and Continental Tire (all whom
213
Amazon.com, perhaps the
engage in business-to-business e-commerce).
leading Internet sales and distribution business, now has a distribution center
(and thus physical presence) in Lexington, South Carolina, with over 1,200 jobs
and is in the process of building a second e-commerce distribution center in
214
Spartanburg, South Carolina.
A.

South CarolinaPersonalJurisdictionApplication

Both the South Carolina General Assembly and the South Carolina Supreme
Court have maintained a relatively strict adherence and interpretation of long215
arm statute jurisdiction.
The statute itself signals such intent. For example, the
legislature stated in section 2 of the Act that the eight enumerated instances of
personal jurisdiction were the sole basis for applying personal jurisdiction to an
216
out-of-state person. Further, the General Assembly expressed that a change of
jurisdiction cannot be created simply for the convenience of parties or
witnesses.217
In the wake of International Shoe and World-Wide Volkswagen, South
Carolina courts have followed the established tests set by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Shortly before World-Wide Volkswagen, however, the South Carolina
Supreme Court ruled in favor of long-arm-jurisdiction in a case of a non-resident
seed company shipping products into the state, finding no violation of due
process. Ruling in Jenkinson v. Murrow Brothers Seed Co., Inc., the court noted:

210. Press Release, S.C. Dep't of Commerce, StarTek, Inc. Selects Horry County for
Customer Service Center (Dec. 16, 2013).
211. See generally S.C. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DISTRIBUTION CENTERS AND LOGISTICS
COMPANIES
(2014),
http://sccommerce.com/sites/default/files/document directory/
distribution and logistics companiesnov_2014.pdf. (detailing the distribution and logistics
centers, including those of Internet entrepreneurial businesses, located in South Carolina).
212. Rainwater, supra note 205.
213. Jeff Wilkinson, Auto Industry ExpansionAcross South CarolinaCausing Economic Tidal
Wave, THE STATE, (S.C.), Mar. 7, 2015.
214. Press Release, S.C. Dep't of Commerce, Amazon Announces New Facility in
Spartanburg County, South Carolina (Jan. 23, 2012).
215. See generally Timothy Clardy, Nonresident Defendants Don't Deserve Convenience or
Justice in South Carolina?,55 S.C. L. REV. 443 (2004) (discussing South Carolina's application of
long-arm statute jurisdiction).
216. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803 (2012).
217. Id.
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It is inferable from the complaint that Murrow certified the seed and
shipped them to South Carolina ". . . with the reasonable expectation
that these goods are to be used and consumed in this State . . . and that

they are so to be used. Accordingly, the activity of the defendant comes
within the provision of the [long-arm] statute, and jurisdiction exists
21
unless the assumption of jurisdiction would violate due process. 8
While Jenkinson would seem to provide good precedent for Internet
jurisdiction to those shipping into the state, South Carolina courts later cautioned
such cases do not normally set a general rule.219 The South Carolina Supreme
Court articulated in Moosally, et. al. v. W W Norton & Co., Inc. that each case
must be viewed on merits and its own fact basis.220
State courts, however, in evaluating the minimal contacts prong and the
sustained and continuous prong of personal jurisdiction, simultaneously evaluate
these factors together with its due process analysis to reach the outer bounds
permitted by due process.221 The Fourth Circuit, of which South Carolina is a
member, reiterated this principle in ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc.222 In
establishing jurisdiction of a personal or general nature, the court instructed that
"the defendant's actions must be directed at a forum state in more than a random,
fortuitous, or attenuated way."223
The court in Cockrell v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co. provided additional
guidance from the South Carolina Supreme Court:
because South Carolina treats its long-arm statute as coextensive with
the Due Process Clause, the sole question becomes whether the exercise
224
of personal jurisdiction would violate due process.
Citing World-Wide Volkswagen, the court further stated:
The foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum state. Rather it
is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are

218. Jenkinson v. Murrow Bros. Seed Co., 272 S.C. 148, 151, 249 S.E.2d 780, 781 (1978).
219. Moosally v. W.W. Norton & Co., 358 S.C. 320, 332, 594 S.E.2d 878, 884-85 (Ct. App.
2004) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Sec. Credit Leasing, Inc. v.
Armaly, 339 S.C. 533, 529 S.E.2d 283 (Ct. App. 2000)).
220. Moosally, 358 S.C. at 327, 594 S.E.2d at 888 (stating that each case must be decided on
its own merits) (citing Engineered Prods. v. Cleveland Crane & Eng'g, 262 S.C. 1, 201 S.E.2d 921
(1974)).
221. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore Inc., 886 F.2d 654, 657 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989).
222. ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 1997).
223. Id. at 625.
224. Cockrell v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 363 S.C. 485, 492, 611 S.E.2d 505, 509 (2005).
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such that he should reasonably anticipate being hauled into court
there.225
Therefore, the test articulated by South Carolina's Supreme Court for
fairness is:
(1) the duration of the activity of the nonresident within the state;
(2) the character and circumstances of the commission of the nonresident's acts;
(3) the inconvenience resulting to the parties by conferring or refusing
to confer jurisdiction over the nonresident; and
226
(4) the State's interest in exercising jurisdiction.
Likewise, the Fourth Circuit's test is similar to that of Hansen, International
Shoe, and World-Wide Volkswagen:
(1) the extent the defendant purposefully avails [him or herself] of the
privilege of conducting activities in South Carolina;
(2) whether the plaintiff's claims arise out of those activities directed at
South Carolina; and,
(3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be
constitutionally reasonable .227
The facts posed in Cockrell proved too remote to justify personal jurisdiction
in South Carolina. The subject of the case was a student injured by an aluminum
baseball bat manufactured out-of-state.228 However, Moosally provides a
potential foretelling of the application of law to a similar Internet case in the
future. Moosally involved a libel action against an author, CBS 60 Minutes, and
the publisher.229 While the court found no personal jurisdiction for the author or
CBS network (both "merely providing information"), 230 it did find long-arm
jurisdiction applying to the book publisher, W. W. Norton:231
The book had been distributed throughout the United States, including
South Carolina ... the Court of Appeals found that the court had
personal jurisdiction over the book publisher because it conducted
business in the state, selling books in approximately 315 bookstores in
the state, and probably selling at least one copy of each title in South

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
Id. (citing Clarkv. Key, 304 S.C. 497, 501, 405 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1991)).
ALS Scan, Inc. v. Dig. Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002).
Cockrell, 363 S.C. at 489, 611 S.E.2d at 507.
Moosally, 358 S.C. at 326, 594 S.E.2d at 881.
Id. at 333, 594 S.E.2d at 885.
Id. at 336, 594 S.E.2d at 887.
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Carolina, in addition to conducting other business activities that
amounted to directing its activities at South Carolina residents.232

&

The Moosally standard would appear to hold well to many Intemet/ecommerce providers. But, even here the element of some "physical presence"
plays a critical role in the court's judicial thinking. Perhaps it might well apply to
Amazon.com who now has physical presence in the state. But, what about major
online retailers who have physical presence in other states, but not South
Carolina? These include department store giants such as Macy's and Lord
Taylor, as well as large, national catalog companies like LLBean. Thus, now
comes the proverbial question about personal jurisdiction for online automobile
sellers such as Tesla.
Federal courts in the District of South Carolina have followed the lead of the
South Carolina Supreme Court,233 though fine differences have arisen in a

number of cases. For example, in Magic Toyota, Inc. v. Jones, the court found
that while the defendants had very little evidence of committing any unlawful
actions themselves in South Carolina, their agency relationship as corporate
officers evidenced personal involvement in decisions and actions that had a
causal relationship to South Carolina, for which their responsibility was
234
foreseeable. Hence, personal jurisdiction was allowed.
Nevertheless, South Carolina federal judges, cognizant of precedent and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, do not normally deviate from South
Carolina's current strict personal jurisdictional practice.
IV.

THE INTERNET'S UNKNOWN JURISDICTION IN SOUTH CAROLINA

A fundamental tenet in effective business management and planning is the
ability to assess risk in order to make reasoned business judgments on behalf of
235

Uncertainty
business owners and investors. Risk is a function of uncertainty.
in business is not a benign, theoretical concept nor a free good. Rather, it is a
business condition that underlies insurance and, hence, a significant cost of
doing business is the procurement of general liability, directors and officers, and
other insurance/risk management products necessary to protect the organization
in the modem, highly litigious and regulatory legal environment.
One survey of major corporations found among other things:

232. Id. at 335-36, 594 S.E.2d at 886 (citing Engineered Prods. v. Cleveland Crane & Eng'g,
262 S.C. 1, 201 S.E.2d 921 (1974)).
233. See, e.g., Magic Toyota, Inc. v. Southeast Toyota Distributors, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 306
(D.S.C. 1992) (ruling in adherence to previous South Carolina Supreme Court decisions).
234. Id. at 315.
235. Kyra
Sheahan,
Business
Risk
Assessment,
HouSTON
CHRONICLE,
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/business-risk-assessment-97.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2016).
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The average outside litigation cost per respondent was nearly $115
million in 2008, up 73% from $66 million in 2000. This represents
an average increase of 9% each year.
For the twenty companies providing data on this issue for the full
survey period, average outside litigation costs were $140 million in
2008, an increase of 112% from $66 million in 2000.
Between 2000 and 2008, average annual litigation costs as a percent
of revenues increased 78% for the fourteen companies providing
data on average litigation costs as a percent of revenues for the full
survey period.
For the thirty-six surveyed companies total 2008 litigation costs
were $4.1 billion.236

&

Key among business risks in the modem day environment of e-commerce is
the ability to recognize and make contingency for legal risk exposure when
entering markets in each U.S. state, as well as in global transnational business.
After all, this is the essence of thefair notice requirements of due process. Long
held since the Supreme Court's ruling in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
Trust Co., notice should be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections."237
But what state, what standard, and what interpretation? As Denis T. Rice
points out, the Internet transcends geographical bounds and, for the first time,
presents the legal environment with actors who operate outside the long-arm of
one state, but through technology enter the state electronically with more than
''minimal contacts" for "sustained and continuous business," yet may have
absolutely no physical presence nor nexus outside the Internet pipeline.238
The Internet, as a novel medium of commerce and communication,
raises two fundamental jurisdictional issues. First, the Internet
diminishes the significance of the physical location of parties involved
in a transaction. Such diminution results from the fact that transactions
in cyberspace, strictly speaking, do not take place in any particular
geographic location or jurisdiction. Second, the Internet alters the
balance of power between buyer and seller. It arms buyers with masses
of information and new analytical tools, such as cyberagents known as
"bots." Also, by rendering geographical limitations almost entirely

236. Lawyers for Civil Justice et al., Address at Duke Law School Conference on Civil
Litigation: Litigation Cost: Survey of Major Corporations 2-3 (May 10-11, 2010).
237. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
238. Denis T. Rice, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Which Law and Forum Apply to Securities
Transactionson the Internet?, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 585, 598 (2000).
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irrelevant, the Internet shifts the balance of power between buyer and
seller.239
South Carolina is surrounded by adjacent states who have established
personal jurisdiction standards for Intemet/e-commerce under particular
conditions. 240 This Article previously discussed North Carolina's status in the
Replacements Ltd. case where the courts ruled that interactive web presence was
241
sufficient contacts to establish long-arm jurisdiction.
In Georgia, the Georgia Court of Appeals in Aero Toy Store, LLC v. Grieves
found that since the defendant, Aero, operated an interactive website through
which it reached out to and did business with persons in Georgia, personal
24
jurisdiction was established.242 The small amount of revenue generated was
irrelevant to the fact that the Internet site was active and available to Georgia
residents.243
In Florida, the question of cyber jurisdiction was answered by way of a
certified question to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Internet Solutions
244
Corp. v. Marshall, a case involving a tortious act committed over the Internet.
The Court affirmed that presence in the state is not necessary to establish long245
arm jurisdiction.
Citing its decision in Renaissance Health PublishingLLC v.
Resveratrol Partners, LLC, Florida's high court held that the selling of books
through an active website was sufficient evidence of more than minimal contacts
and continuous interaction with Florida residents relevant to personal
246
Hence, an interactive website accessible in Florida to Florida
jurisdiction.
residents is sufficient.247
Tennessee takes a stricter approach more analogous to South Carolina, but
with a three-prong test that provides greater clarity for when an Internet-related

239. Id. at 585.
240. See generally Replacements, Ltd. v. MidweSterling, 515 S.E.2d 46, 51 (N.C. Ct. App.
1999) (determining that North Carolina courts may have jurisdiction over companies that advertise
through mail and on websites that are available to North Carolina citizens). See also Internet
Solutions v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1203 (Fla. 2010) ("Because the Florida Supreme Court
concluded that Marshall committed a tortious act in Florida by posting allegedly defamatory
material about ISC that was accessible in Florida . . she is accordingly subject to the Florida longarm statute."); Aero Toy Store, L.L.C. v. Grieves, 631 S.E.2d 734, 741 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)
(holding that Georgia courts have personal jurisdiction over disputes arising between a Georgia
citizen and an out-of-state seller concerning a disputed Internet auction).
241. Replacements, Ltd., 515 S.E.2d at 51.
242. Aero Toy Store, LLC v. Grieves, 631 S.E.2d 734, 741 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
243. Id. at 740-41.
244. Internet Sols., 39 So. 3d at 1215 (answering certified question of whether defamatory
posts about a Florida corporation on an out-of-state website constitute a tortious act within Florida's
long-arm statute).
245. Id. at 1215-16.
246. Id. at 1211 (citing Renaissance Health Publ'g, LLC v. Resveratrol Partners, LLC, 982 So.
2d 739, 742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
247. Id. at 1214.
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case may incur long-arm statute jurisdiction. To meet this burden a plaintiff must
show:
(1) defendant availed himself of the privilege of acting in the forum
state or causing consequences in the forum state;
(2) the cause of action arises from defendant's activities there; and,
(3) the acts of the defendant must have substantial enough connection
to the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the
defendant reasonable.24 8
Finally, should the states challenging Quill prevail in the U.S. Supreme
Court, the South Carolina Sales and Use Tax Act may work well in establishing
a judicial basis long-arm jurisdiction in other cases. The Act's definitions
establishing tax jurisdiction clearly presume business conduct of a non-resident
business, as opposed to simply a physical presence.249 This is explicitly the case
as enumerated in 1(f) and 2(b) of the Act. Thus, no change in legislation would
be needed if Quill were overturned all or in part. South Carolina Code section
12-36-70 states:
"Retailer" and "seller" include every person: (1)(a) selling or auctioning
tangible personal property whether owned by the person or others; (b)
furnishing accommodations to transients for a consideration, except an
individual furnishing accommodations of less than six sleeping rooms
on the same premises, which is the individuals place of abode; (c)
renting, leasing, or otherwise furnishing tangible personal property for a
consideration; (d) operating a laundry, cleaning, dyeing, or pressing
establishment for a consideration; (e) selling electric power or energy;
(f) selling or furnishing the ways or means for the transmission of the
voice or of messages between persons in this State for a consideration.
A person engaged in the business of selling or furnishing the ways or
means for the transmission of the voice or messages as used in this
subitem (f) is not considered a processor or manufacturer; (2)(a)
maintaining a place of business or qualifying to do business in this
State; or (b) not maintaining an office or location in this State but
soliciting business by direct or indirect representatives, manufacturers
agents, distribution of catalogs, or other advertising matter or by any
other means, and by reason thereof receives orders for tangible personal
property or for storage, use, consumption, or distribution in this State.
The department, when necessary for the efficient administration of this
chapter, may treat any salesman, representative, trucker, peddler, or
canvasser as the agent of the dealer, distributor, supervisor, employer, or

248. LAWRENCE A. PIVNICK, TENNESSEE CIRCUIT COURT PRACTICE § 4.4 (2005 ed.).
249. South Carolina Sales and Use Tax Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-5 (2016).
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other person under whom they operate or from whom they obtain the
tangible personal property sold by them, regardless of whether they are
making sales on their own behalf or on behalf of the dealer, distributor,
supervisor, employer, or other person. The department may also treat the
dealer, distributor, supervisor, employer, or other person as a retailer for
250
purposes of this chapter.
V.

CONCLUSION

South Carolina remains a personal jurisdiction legal "donut hole" among the
Southeastern states regarding application of long-arm statutes to non-resident
Internet actors. For those actors entering the budding industrial and consumer
market in South Carolina via the Internet, legal uncertainty remains a certainty.
The issue of providing clear rules for personal jurisdiction in Internet
commerce is not merely a theoretical issue confined to the annals of legal
journals and law reviews. It is, to be sure, a bottom-line cost, risk, and
management diversion in doing business that impedes effective interstate
commerce and ultimately, the cost and availability of products. Annie Ahn sums
this issue succinctly:

'

[T]he lack of clarity in the rules for personal jurisdiction and
jurisdictional discovery creates problems for businesses and sellers who
are uncertain about the kinds of activities that might subject them to
jurisdiction in a particular state and the burdens that may follow. This
uncertainty discourages businesses that are worried about the costs of
litigation from using the Internet to share information and engage in
business transactions, thus inhibiting their growth and ability to
compete.2 5
Indeed, South Carolina could provide clarity to those entering the state by
way of e-commerce as to their exposure to its forum and long-arm personal
jurisdiction for doing business in South Carolina. Such action would put the state
squarely in line with the Supreme Court's ruling in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz. The case established that when a non-resident has fair notice that its
substantial and continuing business relationship in a state may subject the nonresident to suit and personal jurisdiction in the forum state, the test of fairness in

250. Id. § 12-36-70.
251. Ahn, supra note 177, at 2327 (citing Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum
Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 189-90 (1998))
(describing the minimum contacts test's lack of clarity).
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252

Indeed, South Carolina's sales tax statute carries
due process has been met.
253
that implication insofar as tax jurisdiction is concerned.
Thus, the issue of "fair notice" may arise in one of three ways:
(1) test case involving a certified question to the South Carolina
Supreme Court from the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals;
(2) case ruling by the South Carolina Supreme Court, itself; or
(3) statutory action by the South Carolina General Assembly.
VI. Is

THERE AN "EFFECTS" TEST IN THE JURISDICTIONAL FUTURE?

What does the future look like for personal jurisdiction long-arm statutes?
This Article predicts that the courts and/or Congress will be compelled by the
very nature and extent of Internet e-commerce to move from the current
Presence standard to some form of Effects standard in defining jurisdiction for
the future. Using Effects or commercial impact as a basis fits well with the
Internet and its longstanding federal jurisprudence, particularly in commerce and
anti-trust cases.
In the nation's earliest commerce case, Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme
Court recognized local commercial "intercourse" that substantially affects
interstate commerce and is thus subject to Congress' interstate commerce
power.254 A half-century later in Munn v. Illinois, the Supreme Court established
that local commerce having a "close and substantial" effect on interstate
255
commerce was sufficient to establish federal interstate commerce jurisdiction.
Almost a century after Gibbons, railroads were a precursor of the current
Internet issue having the ability to transcend state lines or operate totally within
state lines. Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States, part of
The Shreveport Rate Cases, again established the multi-state effects of local
activity that leads to federal jurisdiction:
[I]n all matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate
traffic that the control is essential or appropriate to the security of that
traffic, to the efficiency of the interstate service, and to the maintenance
of conditions under which interstate commerce may be conducted upon
fair terms and without molestation or hindrance . . . [and when] the
interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so related that the
government of the one involves the control of the other, it is Congress,
and not the State, that is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule,

252. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985).
253. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-5 to -150 (1990) (defining "transient construction property"
to include machinery and other construction-related property brought into the state of South
Carolina for construction projects in the state for use in the South Carolina Sales and Use Tax Act).
254. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
255. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 113 (1876).
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for otherwise Congress would be denied the exercise of its constitutional
authority and the State, and not the nation would be supreme within the
national field.256
Finally, an example is the famous case of Wickard v. Filburn.257 A farmer
who engaged strictly in intrastate commerce with no tangible effect beyond even
his own farm was nonetheless deemed to be under federal interstate commerce
jurisdiction.258 The Court, in preserving President Roosevelt's Second
Agricultural Adjustment Act, invented the concept of "Hypothetical Close and
Substantial Effect." 259 That is, if every small farmer were to collectively engage
in the same behavior, then there would be a close and substantial effect on
260
interstate commerce.
Both the nineteenth and twentieth century cases universally involved states
placing impediments by state regulation or state tax policy on interstate
commerce. The courts asserted Congress as the sole arbiter of appropriate
jurisdiction.261 To be sure, in the twenty-first century, which is characterized by
a well-established and growing system of e-commerce, the tables have turned.
Federal interstate commerce jurisprudence, primarily following Quill, has
usurped traditional state police and taxing powers over its citizens, and provided
an unintended safe harbor to non-resident businesses.262
Toward the end of the twentieth century, the Court provided a glimpse of
bright line boundaries to federal jurisdiction overreach into classic state police
powers. In United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, the Court
eschewed attempts to use the Commerce Clause as a means to federalize
traditional state crimes.263 Nevertheless, the legal principles that currently remain
hold that federal commercial jurisdiction will be limited to economic or
commercial activities that, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, thus precluding state jurisdiction.
An Effects Test basis for establishing personal jurisdiction has arisen in some
state courts and federal circuit courts. In CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, the
Sixth Circuit stated, "if a defendant's contacts with the forum state are related to

256. Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914).
257. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
258. Id. at 127-28.
259. Id.
260. Id. ("Home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce . .
[and]
would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing" the purpose of the Act).
261. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1.
262. Houston, 234 U.S. at 351-52.
263. See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil
remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act as exceeding Congress' Commerce Clause
powers since gender-motivated crimes of violence were not economic activity that substantially
affected interstate commerce). See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (overturning a
federal statute that made possession of a firearm in a school zone a felony as exceeding Congress'
Commerce Clause powers since possession of a firearm in a school zone was not economic activity
that substantially affected interstate commerce).
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the operative facts of the controversy, then an action will be deemed to have
arisen from those contacts."264
In Kauffman Racing Equip., LLC v. Roberts, a case that fits precisely within
the jurisdictional issue posed by e-commerce, Ohio's Supreme Court ruled that
"[g]eneral jurisdiction is proper only where 'a defendant's contacts with the
forum state are of such a continuous and systematic nature that the state may
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if the action is unrelated to
the defendant's contacts with the state."265
Bit by bit, Effects-based long-arm cases proceed in various jurisdictions.
However, the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the applicability of this line of
legal reasoning extending long-arm jurisdiction beyond the parameters of the
Court's previous cases. South Carolina's Supreme Court has followed likewise.
Jurisdictional theories at this time remain just that-theories-that provide
good fodder for legal discourse and discussion. Such theories rest on the
doorstep of Congress for legislators to address or for the Supreme Court to
resolve in light of the substantial change in business practices since the 1940s
posed by the operation of the Internet.
South Carolina's federal courts remain strictly adherent to precedents
discussed previously in this Article. Indeed, a recent case, Power Beverages,
LLC v. Side Pocket Foods Co., presents an object example. Power Beverages, a
South Carolina company, contracted with Side Pocket, an Oregon company to
266
produce Ying Yang vodka.
A dispute arose in which Power Beverages alleged
267
breach of contract, fraud and unfair trade practices.
As a diversity of
citizenship case, Power Beverages filed in U.S. District Court of South Carolina
alleging jurisdiction based upon application of an Effects test:
(1) Side Pocket committed an intentional tort;
(2) Power Beverage felt the brunt of the harm in South Carolina, thus
the focal point of the matter; and
(3) Side Pocket's conduct was aimed as such at the forum that it could
268
be said South Carolina was the focal point.
Power Beverage also asserted that Side Pocket shipped goods into the state
to be consumed in the state, maintained inventory in South Carolina, and
appointed a distributor as its agent in the state.269

264. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1996).
265. Kauffman Racing Equip., LLC v. Roberts, 930 N.E.2d 784, 792 (2010).
266. Power Beverages, LLC v. Side Pocket Foods Co., No. 6:12-CV-00931-TMC (D.S.C. Jan.
22, 2013) (opinion and order) (following precedential standards to determine that the court had no
personal jurisdiction in this action and transferring the case to another jurisdiction).
267. Id. at *3.
268. Lee E. Berlik, Feeling the Effects of Out-of-State Conduct Won't Guarantee Personal
Jurisdiction Over Nonresident, VIRGINIA BUSINESS LITIGATION BLOG (Feb. 1, 2013),
https://www.virginiabusinesslitigationlawyer.com/2013/02/feeling-the-effects-of-out-of.html.
269. PowerBeverages, at *5.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2016

39

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4
86

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 68: 47

Notwithstanding these assertions, the district court found that the parties'
contact was primarily negotiated, executed, and mainly to be performed in
Oregon.270 Factors normally found to show a physical presence in the state were
absent (official agent, employees, business license, incorporation, and facilities)
and the court held that minimum contacts could not be established. 271 The court
dismissed the case, transferring it to the District of Oregon.272
Until the South Carolina Supreme Court issues a ruling defining personal
jurisdiction requirements in the cyber context or the South Carolina General
Assembly enacts specifically-tailored language defining non-resident actors in
Internet/e-commerce and establishes "fair notice" of exposure to forum and
jurisdiction, the question of, "How Long Is South Carolina's Arm?" will remain
unanswered. Internet commercial uncertainty will remain a business certainty
and a prohibitive cost of doing business in the Palmetto state.

270. Id. at *8.
271. Id.
272. Id. at *11.
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